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Abstract
Some studies of policy representation test hypotheses about the relationship between
citizens’ views and elites’ positions on multiple issues by proceeding one issue at a time.
Others summarize citizens’ and elites’ preferences with “ideology scores” and test hypotheses
with these. I show that approach is flawed. It misinterprets citizens’ ideology scores as
summaries of policy preferences, but these scores actually measure ideological consistency
across areas: how often citizens’ ideal policies are liberal or conservative. Examples show
how attending to this distinction overturns conventional wisdom: legislators appear similarly
moderate as citizens, not more extreme; however, politically engaged citizens appear especially
moderate.
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Scholars typically employ one of two approaches when studying political elites’ representation
of public opinion. A first approach tests a hypothesis about the relationship between citizens’
opinions and elites’ positions one issue at a time on each of many issues, and then examines how
well the hypothesis held across issues. For example, Lax and Phillips (2012) examine how likely
policies are to become law at various levels of public support. Gilens (2012) compares how likely
policies are to become law depending on levels of public support among those of various incomes.
And Lenz (2012) examines whether citizens tend to adopt politicians’ views on a variety of issues.1
A second approach first computes measures of individual citizens’ and individual politicians’
overall ‘ideologies’ based on their positions on many policies and tests a hypothesis with these
ideology scores. In such analyses, citizens’ and elites’ policy views are both summarized by
a point on a liberal-conservative index and their locations on this index are then compared.
For example, in their influential analysis, Bafumi and Herron (2010) estimate individual-level
‘ideal points’ for both survey respondents and their Members of Congress. Bafumi and Herron
(2010) use these estimates to assess correspondence between representatives’ policy decisions and
their constituents’ policy preferences, finding that over 90% of voters are more moderate than
legislators, but that donors and primary voters are similarly extreme.
Research summarizing voter preferences with ideological scales has long been conducted (e.g.,
Enelow and Hinich, 1984) but has burgeoned in recent years (Barber, 2014; Barbera´, 2014; Bond
and Messing, 2015; Bonica, 2013; Caughey and Warshaw, 2014; Caughey, 2014; Clinton, 2006;
Ellis and Stimson, 2012; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002; Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Griffin
and Newman, 2005, 2007; Masket and Noel, 2012; Pan and Xu, 2015; Peress, 2013; Rogowski
and Tucker, 2014; Saiegh, 2015; Stone and Simas, 2010; Shor, Berry and McCarty, 2010; Shor,
2013; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014a,b; Tausanovitch, 2014). Expressing a growing sentiment
regarding the superiority of the ideological approach for studying citizens’ policy preferences,
Lo, Proksch and Gschwend (2014) write that “research on elections and party competition is
unthinkable without measures of the ideological positions of voters.”
This article argues that this ideological approach for studying voter preferences has crucial and
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under-appreciated flaws. The key issue I explore is that ideological scales tend to capture citizens’
degree of ideological consistency across policy domains (e.g., ‘this citizen has liberal views on
two-thirds of issues’) but say little about citizens’ views within domains, on issues themselves
(e.g., ‘this citizen supports state-sponsored healthcare’).
To appreciate this distinction between consistency across domains and views within domains,
consider a common use of ideological scales: comparing how ‘extreme’ legislators’ policy
positions are relative to citizens’ views. In studies that employ ideological scales for this task,
individual voters’ or politicians’ ‘extremity’ is typically based on the extremism of their score on
an ideological index estimated from responses to many binary survey items (for citizens) or votes
across many roll calls (for legislators) (e.g., Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Barber, 2014; Masket and
Noel, 2012; Peress, 2013; Rogowski, 2014; Shor, 2013). With this methodology in mind, examine
the political preferences and survey responses given by one voter and one legislator in two issue
areas shown in Table 1. The legislator in Table 1 has consistently conservative but fairly moderate
positions in both issue areas. However, because the legislator comes down on the conservative
side of both issues, the legislator would appear as conservative as possible on an ideological index
created from these two votes. On the other hand, the voter has extreme views in both policy areas.
Nevertheless, one liberal response and one conservative response earns her a score at the middle
of the index. Literature on this topic would thus deem the voter moderate despite her thoroughly
extreme views and the legislator an extremist despite his moderate positions. But this voter is not
really ideologically moderate, she is ideologically mixed; and the legislator is not ideologically
extreme, he is ideologically consistent. Interpreting ideological scales as measuring views on
issues themselves rather than ideological consistency can thus mislead even simple descriptions
of individual’s policy preferences.
[Table 1 about here.]
This distinction has more general consequences for the study of congruence between voters and
their representatives with ideological scales, questions such as “how well [a politician] represents”
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his or her constituency on policy matters (e.g., Bafumi and Herron, 2010) or which constituents a
politician represents best (e.g., Griffin and Newman, 2007; Tausanovitch, 2014).
A second hypothetical illustrates these implications. Suppose you are a Member of Congress
representing a district with five voters. In the upcoming session of Congress, you will be asked
to cast a roll call vote on five issues. Imagine that, wanting to maintain congruence with district
opinion, you conduct a poll of the five voters in your district on these five issues. The results
appear in Table 2. In each cell in Table 2, a 0 corresponds to a conservative view on a policy and a
1 corresponds to a liberal view.
[Table 2 about here.]
The results of the poll give clear guidance about how to vote congruently. On each of the five
issues, a majority of your constituents say they would cast a liberal vote if they were in Congress.
Suppose you accordingly cast a liberal vote on each of these issues. An issue-by-issue approach
– the first main approach to studying policy representation – would reveal your congruence with
district opinion on these issues (e.g., Lax and Phillips, 2012; Krimmel, Lax and Phillips, 2012).
However, imagine a political scientist gains access to your polling data and attempts to assess
your congruence with district opinion using an ideological scale. Since all your constituents hold
some liberal views and some conservative views, they all earn middling scores on an ideological
scale, shown in the last row. But you have taken the liberal position on every single issue.
According to the ideological scale, you are therefore ‘more liberal’ than all of your constituents
(e.g., Bafumi and Herron, 2010). The political scientist’s verdict? You are far out of step.
You may ask this expert: what can you do to be more congruent with constituency opinion?
To appear more congruent on an ideological scale, the political scientist explains, you need to
take a couple positions that a majority of your constituents disagree with so that you appear more
ideologically similar to them. (Thankfully, it does not matter which two.) If your opponent were
to take such a set of incongruent positions on issues, the political scientist warns, she would be a
much more congruent representative overall.
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Clearly the political scientist in this example is wrong. You were not actually out of step with
your constituents’ policy preferences, just more consistently on the liberal side. When scholar
mistake ideological scales for measures of citizens’ policy preferences instead of measures of their
consistency, scholars can reach very different portraits of the relationship between politicians’
decisions and citizens’ views than actually exist at the level of every issue. Not only can ideological
scales mistake congruence for being out of step, they may negatively correlate with it.
It would be highly convenient if ideological scales did not exhibit such pathologies. Capturing
data on citizens’ views on the same issues that legislators have taken positions on and examining
a hypothesis for each issue requires exceptional effort (e.g., Gilens, 2012; Lax and Phillips, 2012;
Lloren and Wu¨est, 2014; Matsusaka, 2015). Constructing a ‘joint scale’ that bridges politicians
and voters may require only a few points of overlap (e.g., Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Barber, 2014;
Jessee, 2009; Shor, 2013), or potentially none (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Hare et al., 2014;
Ramey, 2014). Unfortunately, studying citizen’s policy preferences is simply not as easy as these
methods imply.
The problem with all such ideological scaling approaches – no matter how many dimensions
they estimate, or how they model the underlying dimension(s) being estimated – is their assumption
that citizens do not have distinct views on distinct policies separate from what their ideologies
dictate, justifying inferences about citizens’ views on issues from their scores on an ideological
index (e.g., Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2006; Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Jessee, 2009;
Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013). This article examines this idea in detail and shows how it
fails in ways that can significantly distort the study of representation. I first develop further
intuition about why studying representation with ideological scales yields different conclusions
than studying issues and introduce the data I will use to illustrate these arguments. I then show
that we should prefer the answers issue-by-issue approaches yield, underscoring that citizens do
have views on individual policies that ideological scales cannot capture, contrary to what recent
scholarship has asserted. I also show how ideological scales fail to accurately capture theoretically
significant patterns in these views: citizens with more moderate scores on ideological scales are
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no more likely to support moderate policies, despite that scholars using ideological scales refer to
such citizens as moderates.
Two applications then illustrate how widely accepted findings based on ideological scales may
be in need of revisiting. First, the policies citizens support appear no more moderate than legislators
in many policy domains, contrary to what ideological scales imply. Second, the most educated and
engaged citizens tend to have the most moderate policy views, even though they appear the most
‘extreme’ on ideological measures. I conclude by discussing the potential implications for other
literatures of attending to the distinction between the concept ideological scales appear to measure,
citizens’ ideological consistency across policy domains, and the concept to which most theories
of representation concern, individual policy issues. Across a wide variety of research questions,
ideological scales are likely to yield inaccurate descriptions of citizens’ policy preferences and
reach erroneous conclusions how politicians represent them.
Comparing Strategies for Studying Policy Representation
In this section I introduce the data and use it to further develop intuition about why issue-by-issue
and ideological approaches to studying representation can provide different conclusions.
Data
To help illustrate the differences between the conclusions about representation ideological
approaches and issue-by-issue approaches yield, I conducted two national surveys with Survey
Sampling International with unique items. (The Supplementary Appendix describes the survey
questions and procedures.) The items spanned twelve issues: health care, gun control, immigration,
taxes, abortion, the environment, Medicare, gay rights, affirmative action, unions, contraception,
and education. Significantly, the items offered citizens the opportunity to voice support for policies
more moderate and more extreme than the parties support within a variety of policy domains,
with these policy alternatives described concretely (see the Supplementary Appendix for the full
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questionnaire):
• at 1 and 2 on the scale, two extremely liberal policies that very few Democratic Members of
Congress support, described concretely,
• at 3 on the scale, a policy corresponding to the typical Democratic view advanced by party
leaders and most in the rank-and-file, described concretely,
• at 4 on the scale, a ‘moderate’ policy that is to the right of most Democratic elected officials’
positions but to the left of most Republicans’, usually describing the status quo, described
concretely,
• at 5 on the scale, a ‘Republican’ choice mirroring the Democratic choice at point 3, described
concretely, and,
• at 6 and 7 on the scale, two extremely conservative choices to the right of most Republican
elites, described concretely.
Such items present two advantages. First, as variegated scales, these items capture a continuum
of preferences, not just a binary that partitions respondents on one side or the other of a salient
divide. Because they lack this quality,2 existing issue-specific data have not allowed us to examine
the relationships between ideological scales and underlying issue preferences in fine detail.
In addition, anchoring the party’s positions at a fixed point on the scale also helps retain
one of the benefits of ideological ‘joint scaling,’ being able to estimate where in the distribution
of legislators’ preferences a voter’s preferences would belong (e.g., Bafumi and Herron, 2010).
Rather than relying on potentially problematic statistical assumptions to conduct this ‘bridging’
across many issues, I have relied upon human judgment to place the parties on scales and then
allowed respondents to place themselves. To craft the scales for each issue area, a team of research
assistants catalogued the positions of all senators from the 113th Congress on these issues. The
positions were then validated by attempting to place all 100 sitting US Senators’ positions on each
issue on the scales, revising the scales as necessary when it did not adequately capture a common
position in the political debate. All Senators were then coded once the scales were finalized (see
the Supplementary Appendix).
There is no doubt room for improvement in the construction of these scales. Future work
can and should make these improvements and endeavor to make stronger claims about the exact
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distribution of public opinion than I advance here.3 However, this data provides a reasonable
proving ground for my more humble goals: illustrating how the differences between ideological
and issue-specific approaches derived analytically manifest in real opinion data.
Differences Between Public Opinion On Issues and Ideological Scales
Figure 1 presents the raw distributions of respondent’s responses in each of the twelve issue
areas. These data will help concretely illustrate why issue-by-issue and ideological approaches
to studying representation may yield different answers.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Suppose an analyst is interested in understanding how often citizens tend to support moderate
policies. Ideological scales are often used for identifying which citizens are moderate, and tend
to suggest that citizens are moderates by and large (e.g., Fiorina and Abrams, 2009; Bafumi and
Herron, 2010). The heart of this article’s argument concerns what students of representation should
do with data like that depicted in Figure 1 when attempting to explore a question such as whether
citizens tend to support moderate policies.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 illustrates how each of the two approaches to studying policy representation would
approach this question. An ideological approach for aggregating across items and respondents
is shown in example data at the top right of Table 3. This approach first computes the average
of each voters’ responses and computes the distribution of voters’ ‘typical responses.’ Note how
this approach entails summarizing each voter’s preferences across multiple issues to a point on a
single scale. It also leads both voters to appear similarly moderate because neither reliably hews
to one ideological side, despite that they strongly disagree with each other on both issues. The real
public opinion data exhibit a similar tendency. The results of this same approach in the full public
opinion data I described are shown in the top panel of Figure 2. As can be seen, the overwhelming
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tendency is for individual voters’ ‘average responses’ to be near 4, the moderate anchor. The
conclusion that one might reach from this data thus mirror the conclusion in the literature more
generally that voters reliably support moderate policies (Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2006;
Fiorina, Abrams and Pope, 2005; Fiorina and Abrams, 2009), despite that Figure 1 showed that
non-moderate responses on issues were common.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Now consider a second approach to drawing conclusions from this data: analyzing it one issue
at a time, and then aggregating across issues. This approach is shown at the bottom right in Table
3. This approach first considers the pattern on every issue and then estimates what pattern is typical
on issues, yielding a picture of the distribution of mass opinion on the ‘typical issue’ in the survey.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that this ‘issue-by-issue’ procedure characterizes these
respondent’s issue preferences markedly differently than the ideological approach. For example,
the bottom panel shows that about 30% of Americans give one of the two most left-wing responses
on the typical question. However, the top panel shows that nearly none of these respondents gave
this response on every question, meaning few respondents have ‘average views’ this extreme. This
potentially gives the impression that nearly no Americans support policies as or more left wing
than the Democratic party, anchored at 3 (e.g., Bafumi and Herron, 2010). Nevertheless, a look
at the raw data without summarizing voters on one dimension suggests that many citizens support
such positions.
These data, although quite naively aggregated, thus help illustrate why mapping voters to an
ideological scale can change the conclusions we draw about their views. By averaging voters’
views across many policy areas into an index, an ideological scale tells us how likely voters are to
be somewhere on the liberal or conservative side of a policy selected at random. What we typically
learn from this exercise is that most voters have some mix of liberal and conservative views. This
observation seems to imply very little about these voters’ views on issues themselves.
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Can An Ideological Scale Summarize Voters’ Preferences?
The previous sections showed how issue-specific and ideological approaches to studying citizens’
views may yield quite different answers, but offered no guidance about which approach’s answer
should be trusted. This section casts doubt on the validity of the ideological approach’s answer
more directly. I first show that the main assumption underpinning it is flawed. I then show that
relying on ideological scales anyway is not innocuous, as ideological scales fail to correlate with
the concept they are often used to measure.
Citizens Have Meaningful Issue Preferences Their Ideologies Cannot Predict
Scholars have traditionally been skeptical that citizens conceive of politics in ideological terms or
have ideologically-driven preferences. The primary evidence for this claim is straightforward. If
one or two dimensions did capture Americans’ views well, Americans’ attitudes on individual
issues should correlate strongly, but empirically they correlate only weakly (e.g., Baldassarri
and Gelman, 2008; Converse, 1964; Kinder and Sears, 1985). Likewise, one or two dimension
can explain far less of the variation in citizens’ responses to surveys than in elite roll-call votes
(Noel, 2014; Treier and Hillygus, 2009).4 When choosing between issue-by-issue approaches to
studying citizens’ views or ideological scales, this traditional perspective would tend to privilege
issue-specific measures, believing citizens to have distinct views on distinct issues that cannot be
captured by an ideological label or score.
A growing chorus among scholars who rely on ideological scales has questioned this traditional
perspective (e.g., Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2006, 2008; Jessee, 2009; Tausanovitch and
Warshaw, 2014b). According to this critique, the considerations that inform citizens’ views on
issues can be simplified down to one or two dimensions nearly entirely – hence Bafumi and
Herron (2010) write that we should think of citizens as having latent ideological “ideal points
that drive their...choices.”5 However, citizens are thought to make significant mistakes as they
attempt to apply their ideological predispositions on surveys, generating large measurement error.
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Thus, issue items in surveys tend to correlate very weakly with each other because measurement
error attenuates these correlations dramatically, even though citizens’ underlying preferences are
thoroughly one- or two-dimensional.
This alternative perspective, if true, should lead us to prefer the conclusions about public
opinion and representation that ideological scales yield. For example, the issue-specific measures
shown in the previous section may be plagued with measurement error that buffets citizens away
from providing their true moderate preferences, but aggregating their views across many issues
into an ideological index may reduce this noise and reveal citizens’ true moderate nature.
Is there much informing Americans’ survey responses to particular policy items beyond their
ideologies and error? Suppose the new ideological perspective were correct and measurement error
artificially attenuates correlations it is possible to achieve with individual issue items on surveys so
much that citizens’ ideological nature is nearly completely obscured. Such measurement error
should dramatically attenuate all correlations one can achieve between two individual survey
questions. Therefore, we should tend to observe similarly low correlations between two different
issue items in the same survey and between an issue item when it is measured in a first survey and
the same item when it is asked again. After all, according to this line of reasoning, these responses
are all noisy reflections of the same underlying ideological predisposition. On the other hand, if
the classic perspective is correct that citizens have distinct views on distinct policy issues separate
from their ideologies, we would predict significantly higher test-retest correlations within issue
areas than across issue areas.
To help adjudicate between these alternatives, I conducted a panel survey (see Supplementary
Appendix). Respondents were contacted again two months after a first survey wave and asked the
same battery of policy questions again. This panel allows me to compare inter-issue and intra-issue
correlations. 515 responded to both waves.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 3 shows respondents’ first-test and re-test responses within each issue and across issues.
Each subgraph in Figure 3 shows individuals’ responses on a first issue in the first test on the
10
x-axis and individuals’ scores on a second test given one month later on the y-axis. Raw data and
a loess smoothed line are both shown for transparency and simplicity. The test-retest polychoric
correlation is shown above each graph.
If a liberal-conservative continuum was able to capture Americans’ views but inter-issue
correlations were nearly extinguished by measurement error, we should see similarly low interwave
correlations between individual issue items and across different issue items. However, the plots
on the diagonal show that interwave correlations within issues are considerably larger than
correlations between different issues. The mean correlation within issues over time is 0.56,
but the mean correlation between different issues is only 0.13. This contrast is inconsistent
with the measurement error account for low inter-issue correlations. Citizens have persistent
views on individual issues that do not correlate strongly with their views on other issues. (The
Supplementary Appendix shows these figures for high- and low- political knowledge respondents.)
Two other pieces of evidence consistent with citizens’ ‘ideological innocence’ outside this
article’s scope are worthy of note. First, in a companion paper with Douglas Ahler, I show that
professed issue preferences inconsistent with citizens’ ostensible ideologies (and that ideological
scales classify as ‘errors’) can powerfully predict citizens’ subsequent choices. Moreover, citizens
do not appear to place any significance on whether the ‘mix of views’ implied by a politicians’
place on an ideological scale is closer to their own (Ahler and Broockman, 2015). Second,
although often cited to justify ideological scaling for originally identifying that measurement
error can attenuate observed correlations between issues, Achen (1975) shows that error-corrected
correlations between separate policy domains are usually low (see Achen (1975), Table 5).6
There is no doubt some measurement error in Americans’ responses to survey questions
and empirical analysts are wise to consider it (e.g., Palmquist and Green, 1992). However,
this measurement error has not been shown to be of the particular variety that would justify
ideological scaling. Rather, despite what scholars who employ ideological scales have offered
in justification, there is little reason to doubt what a long line of public opinion research has found:
most citizens are ‘ideologically mixed,’ genuinely supporting liberal policies in some domains and
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conservative policies in others (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008; Converse, 1964; Kinder and Sears,
1985; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Zaller, 2004).
‘Ideological Moderates’ Are No More Likely To Support Moderate Policies
It may both be the case that the assumptions underpinning ideological scaling are unsound and that
the answers scales provide tend to be correct. As the adage goes, all models are wrong, but some
are useful. Here I show ideological scales do not seem useful for one of their main purposes.
Ideological scales are often said to identify citizens whose policy preferences are more
‘moderate’ or ‘extreme’ (e.g., Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Fiorina, Abrams and Pope, 2005).
However, despite their common use for this purpose, it is unknown whether the vast majority
of citizens with moderate scores on ideological scales are actually more likely to support
moderate policies than the citizens with extreme scores. As previously noted, citizens appear
to earn moderate ideology scores by being ideologically mixed, with each supporting their own
idiosyncratic mix of liberal and conservative policies (e.g., Zaller, 2004). Nevertheless, they may
also be more likely to support moderate policies, too.
To examine the ability of ideological scales to identify individuals who tend to support
moderate and extreme policies, I move beyond the crude ideological ‘scale’ depicted in the
bottom of Figure 2 and instead rely upon the state-of-the-art approach for estimating ideological
scales, Item Response Theory (e.g., Martin and Quinn, 2002). To do so, I administered a series
of 21 yes-or-no questions drawn from the questionnaires employed by prominent articles that
use estimate citizens’ ‘ideal points’ from issue questions elsewhere in the same survey (see
Supplementary Appendix). I then estimated an IRT model from these items using the MCMCpack
package in R (Martin, Quinn and Park, 2011). Recall that this approach is ultimately similar to
the one described in the bottom panel of Figure 1: each respondent’s responses to many issue
questions are boiled down to a point on a scale.
Figure 4 shows the results. The first two panels of Figure 4 reinforce the point that ideological
scales measure ideological consistency across policy domains, how often a citizen comes down on
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the liberal or conservative side of the status quo. The x-axis on these panels refer to individuals’
ideology scores built from binary questions, such that ideological moderates appear in the middle,
‘ideological extremists’ appear on the far left and far right. The y-axis on panel (a) records the
share of the 7-point issue questions respondents gave an ‘extreme liberal’ answer to (at 1 or 2),
and the y-axis on panel (b) records the share of these 7-point questions respondents gave an
‘extreme conservative’ answer to (at 6 or 7). The expected relationships between the ideological
scale and support for more immoderate policies on each side of the spectrum do hold: ‘extreme
ideological liberals’ do tend to hold extreme liberal views on more issue and ‘extreme ideological
conservatives’ do tend to hold extreme conservative views on more issues.
[Figure 4 about here.]
But are ‘ideological moderates’ especially likely to support moderate policies in general? The
y-axis in Panel (c) adds together the y-axes from panels (a) and (b), corresponding to the total
number of extreme policies each respondent supported in the 12 seven-point questions. The x-axis
in Panel (c) again corresponds to each respondents’ score on the ideological scale estimated via
IRT, with ‘ideological moderates’ in the middle. If extreme scores on ideological scales measured
support for more extreme policies and moderate scores with support for moderate policies, we
should observe a ‘V’ shape in Panel (c), whereby citizens with more extreme scores on the
ideological scale are also more likely to support extreme policies. However, individuals with
more extreme ideology scores appear no more likely to express extreme views than ‘ideological
moderates.’ Likewise, those with more moderate scores are no more likely to support moderate
policies in general than are ‘ideological extremists.’7 Self-reported ideological extremity also only
barely predicts support for extreme policies.8 The extremity of citizens’ views on issues and
‘extremism’ as political scientists measure it with ideological scales appear literally orthogonal
– in fact, if anything, no one is less moderate than ideological moderates.
This data suggests we should think about citizens with extreme and moderate scores on
ideological scales differently. Citizens do not earn moderate scores on ideological scales because
the policies they support are especially moderate. They earn these scores because ideological scales
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have difficulty predicting their views. A citizen with a moderate score on an ideological scale is
likely to support some liberal policies in some areas and conservative policies in some others,
but we have no way of knowing in which. On the other hand, citizens with extreme scores on
ideological scales are especially ideologically consistent, tending to come down on one ideological
side across many policies. We can learn which side of the debate these citizens tend to come down
on from their scores. But these citizens do not appear any more likely to support extreme policies
within these domains than their moderate counterparts. These revised interpretations underscore
how citizens’ scores on ideological scales primarily measures the consistency of their views across
policy domains, even as political scientists interpret them as measuring views on actual policies.
Applications
The evidence presented so far has suggested that ideological measures may significantly mislead
the study of representation as they appear to say little about citizens’ views on issues. To illustrate
the importance of attending to this distinction, I now explore how two widely accepted conclusions
largely drawn from ideological scales may need revisiting.
Application 1: An artificial ‘disconnect’ – How ideological scales distort the
study of collective representation
In the United States today, an ambitious reform agenda seeks to expand the role of elites as
delegates, hoping they will more closely attend to public opinion (e.g., Kousser, Phillips and Shor,
2014; Lessig, 2011; Mann and Ornstein, 2013). A stated rationale for much of this agenda is an
empirical claim drawn from ideological scales: voters reliably support more moderate policies than
elites (e.g., Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2006; Stone and Simas, 2010; Masket and Noel,
2012). For example, Bafumi and Herron (2010) find that only 10% of American voters prefer
policies that are as extreme as their representatives in Congress. For many reformers, it follows
from this view that, if we observe one political party successfully pursuing a policy that we see
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as undesirable relative to the status quo, most voters will support a less extreme and thus more
desirable alternative. For example, in support of campaign finance reform, Lessig (2011) writes:
“Fundraising happens among the extreme, and that puts pressure on the extremist [politicians]
to become even more extreme.” Similarly, Mann and Ornstein (2013) recommend that we can
“moderate politics by expanding the electorate.”
This new conventional wisdom concerning legislators’ extremism and voters’ moderation
stands in sharp contrast to classic empirical studies that find American politicians provide robust
‘collective representation.’ As a whole, this literature suggested, elites do tend to support policies
in concert with the public’s views (e.g., Weissberg, 1978). Moreover, if anything, these classic
studies assumed that political elites would only support policies within a relatively narrow and
moderate range relative to the broad range of policies for which many citizens might voice support
(e.g., Kingdon, 1989, page 291).9 But recent scholars using ideological measures consistently
conclude the opposite: political elites support policies far more extreme than citizens, leaving
Americans governed by extremists fundamentally “disconnected” from rank-and-file Americans’
reliably moderate demands (e.g., Fiorina and Abrams, 2009; Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Henderson,
2013; Hill and Tausanovitch, 2014; McCarty et al., 2014).
There is reason to suspect these new studies’ departure from classic wisdom are an artifact
of the ideological measures they use. Research has long found that elites tend to consistently
take positions on one side of the ideological spectrum across many policy areas but also eschew
taking positions that are too extreme within any policy area (e.g., Converse and Pierce, 1986;
Jennings, 1992). This is reminiscent of the legislator from Table 1, who scored at the extreme
of an ideological scale for having consistently conservative views despite having fairly moderate
positions on issues themselves. If political elites have positions like this, they may appear ‘extreme’
on ideological scales by virtue of their consistency across policy domains (‘this legislator supports
the liberal position on every single policy’), even if elites tend to stake out fairly moderate positions
on issues themselves (‘none of this legislator’s positions are very far to the left’).
Figures 1 and 2 provided the first evidence consistent with this possibility. Many citizens voice
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support for policies well to the left or right. But when these views are ‘averaged’ at the individual
level, they appear moderate on the whole.
What happens when this same procedure is applied to elites? To compare what happens when
voters and elites are examined one issue at a time or on ideological scales, I conducted a parallel
survey to a convenience sample of sitting state legislators in April 2013 and administered the same
issue batteries as I delivered to the mass public.10 This survey was not intended to be strictly
representative of sitting legislators, but merely to explore the consequences of the much greater
degree of ideological consistency typically present in elite samples.11
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 depicts the results of this survey in the same two ways the mass survey results were
depicted in Figure 2: the top panel shows the distributions of individual legislators’ ‘typical
responses,’ whereas the bottom panel shows the frequency of the legislators’ responses on the
‘typical issue.’
A first striking pattern is worthy of comment: there is strong similarity between the results these
two aggregation approaches yield among elites. This shows what the dimensionality assumption
underpinning ideological scales looks like when it holds, and why ideological scales have been
so widely adopted among scholars of political elites. Political elites who are to the left of the
Democratic party on one issue, for example, tend to be consistently to the left of the Democratic
party across most other issues also. This means that their views can be meaningfully summarized
by a point on a scale – ‘left-wing Democrats.’12
But what happens when we add voters to the picture? A comparison of the bottom panels
in Figure 2 and Figure 5 suggests that the public in fact delivers similar amounts of support for
moderate and immoderate policies as legislators. At the level of the public (shown previously
in Figure 2), the deep blue and red bars at points 1, 2, 6, and 7 on the scale received a great
deal of support: on the typical question about 45% of the public offered these positions. On
the typical issue at the elite level – which ideological scores suggest are a hotbed of support for
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extreme policies – the modal responses centered nearly exactly at points 3 and 5, where the parties’
expected positions were specified ex ante. Moreover, legislators were actually slightly less likely
to describe their positions at points 1, 2, 6, and 7. And, the exact same share – 18% at both the
mass and elite levels – picked a ‘moderate’ option on the typical policy. This is quite a different
portrait than existing literature paints, such as Bafumi and Herron’s (2010) conclusion that only
10% of the public supports policies more extreme than legislators. However, when these data are
mapped to a single dimension as existing literature is accustomed, voters again appeared moderate
and elites retained their clusterings, now at the extremes.
The ‘disconnect’ scholars routinely report thus seems to be an artifact of the ideological
measures they use, which assign ‘ideologically mixed’ Americans middling scores on an index
and ‘ideologically consistent’ politicians extreme scores. It is certainly too soon to confidently
overturn conventional wisdom based just on these unique survey items and this one sample.
It is possible that measurement error would change the picture slightly (Section D in the
Supplementary Appendix discusses this possibility), or that other issues would yield different
answers. Nevertheless, the finding that nearly half the public supports policies more extreme than
legislators on the typical issues in this survey raises questions about the new conventional wisdom
that voters are reliably more moderate. On individual issues, these patterns of moderation and
extremism do not reliably persist. Rather, collective representation may be significantly stronger
than ideological scales imply (Weissberg, 1978).
One may wonder whether the aggregation strategies pursued in the Figures above do justice to
the more sophisticated procedures employed by methods such as IRT models, but Figure 8 in the
Supplementary Appendix uses data from the binary response options delivered to both the mass
public and legislators to show that state of the art methods do not overcome these problems. The
IRT estimates look like the bottom panels on Figures 2 and 5, suggesting these legislators are
reliably more extreme despite what is plain in the data when it is aggregated by issue first.
Of course, the whole truth is never quite so simple. An additional benefit of examining
representation on individual issues is the heterogeneity across issues that this mode of analysis can
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reveal (e.g., Lax and Phillips, 2012; Pacheco, 2014). And there indeed appears to be substantial
heterogeneity in the collective relationship between politicians and voters on different issues.
Moreover, this heterogeneity may be theoretically significant. The issue data in Figure 1 suggested
a quite different ‘disconnect’ prevails on many issues than existing literature deems possible:
elites in both parties sometimes spurn many voters in the same way – declining to raise taxes on
the wealthy by large amounts or increasing spending on social insurance programs dramatically,
for example, or being much harsher towards undocumented immigrants. Such patterns are ripe
for further investigation. They may also have implications for reformers. If public opinion is
assumed to be a moderate gold standard, encouraging legislators to act as delegates of voters
may seem obviously desirable (e.g., Lessig, 2011; Mann and Ornstein, 2013). But examining the
public’s potentially unwise preferences on individual issues (Sances, 2014) provides an important
reminder: faithful representation of sometimes-extreme public opinion is not the sole standard to
which representatives can aspire (Burke, 1774).
Application 2: Political Sophistication and Extremity of Opinion
Scholars are not only concerned with how well politicians represent the public overall; they are
also concerned with which citizens politicians tend to represent best or are most responsive to.
Here again a rich tradition that tests who is represented in a variety of particular issue areas
(e.g., Dahl, 1961; Gilens, 2012) coexists with a recent literature asking similar questions using
ideological scales (e.g., Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Bartels, 2008; Bhatti and Erikson, 2011; Griffin
and Newman, 2005, 2007; Fiorina and Abrams, 2009; Tausanovitch, 2014).
Perhaps the most influential finding about who politicians represent best that is based on
ideological scales regards the allegedly radicalizing influence of especially engaged citizens.
Because politically engaged, active, and knowledgeable individuals appear extreme on ideological
scales, they have often been implicated in leading legislators to support extreme policies (e.g.,
Abramowitz, 2010; Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Fiorina, 1999; Fiorina and Abrams, 2009). Fiorina
and Levendusky (2006) clearly state this idea: “People who are active in politics tend to have more
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extreme views than ordinary voters.”
The notion that engaged citizens’ policy views are more extreme may seem natural, but sits at
odds with a great deal of classic literature. This literature suggested that rank-and-file members
of the public with the least political information and education were the most likely to support
extreme endeavors (e.g., Kingdon, 1989; Stouffer, 1955). On the other hand, as Zaller (1984)
wrote, educated and politically engaged citizens were widely accepted to be “more rather than less
likely to conform to prevailing convention” (p. 22), hewing to beliefs within the mainstream.
Why, then, might knowledgable individuals appear more extreme on ideological scales?
Classic political behavior research also provides an answer. This research would expect politically
engaged citizens to be the most ideologically consistent across issues, as they tend to support their
party’s side of salient issues (e.g., Converse, 1964; Glaeser and Ward, 2006; Lenz, 2012; Zaller,
1992). The greater ideological loyalty of political sophisticates to one side of many policy debates
could account for why sophisticates appear ‘extreme’ on the ideological scales, even if their views
within these policy areas tend not to be extreme.
Are engaged and knowledgable Americans in fact more likely to support extreme policies, or
merely more ideologically consistent across policy domains? The left panel in Figure 6 shows
that highly engaged and knowledgable individuals are the likeliest to have extreme scores on an
ideological scale as they consistently fall on their parties’ side of the ideological spectrum across
many issues. This replicates the typical finding that extremity on an ideological measure (shown
on the y-axis, and computed using IRT from the 20 binary items) correlates strongly and positively
with a political knowledge scale13 (on the x-axis) (t > 14, p < 0.001) (Abramowitz, 2010; Fiorina
and Abrams, 2009). Highly knowledgable individuals are more likely to voice support for one of
the two parties’ side of many policy debates.
[Figure 6 about here.]
However, political sophisticates appear no less likely to support moderate policies within policy
areas than other Americans. In fact, the second panel of Figure 6 suggests that the truth may be
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closer to the reverse: individuals who are higher in political knowledge appear less likely to support
policies that are more extreme than the parties’ positions (p < 0.001). Highly knowledgeable
and politically attuned Americans may appear extreme on ideological scales merely because they
consistently answer in line with one of the parties’ positions, but they do not seem more likely to
prefer more extreme policies than other Americans. (Section E of the Supplementary Appendix
discusses whether these pattern are attributable to measurement error.)
The same reversal of conventional wisdom persists among self-reported14 primary voters,
another class of individuals scholars routinely indict for drawing politics to the extremes (e.g.,
Brady, Han and Pope, 2007; Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006).15 Self-reported primary voters appear
(slightly) less likely to volunteer extreme views than those who do not report voting in a primary
(p < 0.001), even though they are much more ‘extreme’ on ideology measures by virtue of their
greater loyalty to their ideological side across issues (p < 0.001).
The role of political information does not seem to be to pull voters outside the realm of
mainstream political debate; quite the contrary. With that said, this evidence does nothing to
impeach arguments that strong partisans and political activists are increasingly likely adopt their
parties’ views or express disdain for the other party (e.g., Mason, 2014; Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes,
2012). However, extremity of opinion on a given issue is a separate construct from – and is not
guaranteed to correlate positively with – ideological consistency across issues, intensity of opinion
on issues, or strength of partisan identification.
Other Potential Applications
Relaxing the assumption that voters’ views can be summarized on by one or two dimensions
may also have implications for the study of representation more generally, as one-dimensional
ideological scales have formed the basis of much conventional wisdom in numerous literatures. I
briefly elaborate three more examples to illustrate this potential.
First, an influential literature considers the conditions under which elites are ‘held accountable
to voters more strongly.’ This concept is often operationalized as the extent to which politicians’
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estimated ideal points are moderate (e.g., Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002; Snyder and
Stro¨mberg, 2010). This metric is premised upon the idea that voters by and large want ideological
moderates to represent them. Yet, consider again the example from Table 2. In order to represent
majority will on every issue, the legislator in that example must take the liberal position on every
issue and appear ‘very liberal’ ideologically. On the other hand, legislators who were actually out
of step with more constituents would seem ideologically closer to the district. Thus, even though
scholars often assume that ‘moderate’ representatives represent voters’ preferences more closely,
it is possible that legislators who appear ‘ideologically extreme’ are actually likelier to agree with
their constituents on issues – even if voters’ views are not extreme.16 The substantive conclusions
of studies using ideology to study electoral accountability depend upon how voters evaluate the
particular policies on which moderate legislators and extreme legislators disagree.17
Second, the literature on race and unequal representation has attempted to judge the conditions
under which Latinos and whites are better represented by comparing the one-dimensional ideal
points of legislators to the typical ideal points imputed to white and Latino voters (Griffin
and Newman, 2007). However, consider a hypothetical libertarian legislator representing a
Latino-majority district. This libertarian could appear ‘moderate’ and in-step with her constituents
on a one-dimensional scale due to being ‘liberal on some issues and conservative on others,’ just as
Latinos tend to be. However, the specific issues on which libertarians are liberal and conservative
tend to be the opposite of Latinos. Such a legislator might thus be very unrepresentative of her
Latino constituents’ views on all issues and appear to be a ‘good ideological fit.’ Recommendations
on how to encourage better representation of Latinos’ views based on one-dimensional scales
thus may yield counterproductive results.18 Similar issues could arise in studies of differential
representation by income, partisan responsiveness, and sub-constituency responsiveness, many of
which rely on ideological scales (e.g., Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower, 2014; Bartels, 2008;
Bhatti and Erikson, 2011; Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Ezrow et al., 2011). Because ideological
consistency correlates with many of these attributes, these studies may reach conclusions about
representation that instead reflect unrelated reasons certain groups tend to be more ideologically
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loyal. Measures of issue-specific opinion are necessary to assess these questions.
Finally, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014a) report a remarkable finding based on ideological
scales: voters are completely unaware of the ideological positions of their Members of Congress,
once what they can guess from party is taken into account. This lack of voter awareness spells
troubling implications for democratic accountability, they conclude, and allows legislators to
pursue their out-of-step agendas. But Ansolabehere and Jones (2010), using the very same dataset,
have shown that voters are actually remarkably knowledgable about these same legislators’ votes
on individual bills, much more so than one could guess based on their party alone. It is difficult
to see how measurement error could account for Ansolabehere and Jones’s (2010) results. And it
does not seem desirable to average voters’ knowledge away into an index of their perceptions that
exaggerates their ignorance by attributing their knowledge to error.
Discussion: Studying Representation of Ideological Innocents
Scholars often pursue one of two strategies when seeking to characterize public opinion and
investigate how politicians represent it. The first strategy is exemplified in recent work like Gilens’s
(2012) Affluence and Influence, Lax and Phillips’s (2012) “Democratic Deficit in the States,” and
Lenz’s (2012) Follow The Leader. These works first collect data about the public’s opinions on a
number of issues and then ask research questions at the level of these issues – for example, how
predictive are lower income Americans’ support of particular proposals for whether it ultimately
becomes law? How much public support is typically necessary until a proposal is likely to be
enacted? Showing the consistency of these works’ hypotheses across a number of issues facilitates
their persuasive contributions.
An alternative, increasingly popular approach first summarizes citizens’ preferences across a
variety of issues to estimate their ideological orientations (or asks respondents to supply their own
general ideology). It then describes public opinion and tests hypotheses about its representation in
government using these ideological summaries.
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These ideological summaries are often interpreted as summaries of citizens’ policy preferences,
but they primarily measure ideological consistency: the share of policies on which an individual
has a liberal or conservative view. Citizens’ scores say little about how liberal or how conservative
their views on these issues are. Moreover, for the vast majority of citizens who support an
idiosyncratic mix of liberal and conservative policies, their middling scores imply nothing about
their view on any issue, not allowing us to do better than guessing when predicting which side of
an issue they are likely to be on.
This article first illustrated analytically how attending to this distinction between ideological
consistency across policy domains and policy views within domains can have dramatic
implications for studying representation. For example, what appears to be a legislator providing
‘good representation’ on an ideological index can correspond to very poor representation in reality
if legislators do not match their constituents on the actual issues that go into the index; likewise,
as Table 2 showed, legislators providing very close representation of public opinion in reality can
appear out of step on an ideological index if their constituents are not as ideologically consistent
as they are. Ideological measures can thus lead to inaccurate answers to the significant questions
they are increasingly used to investigate, such as “how well [a politician] represents” his or her
constituency. The key issue with such measures is their fundamental assumption that do not have
meaningful views distinct from their ideological orientations. A rich history of public opinion
research has detailed that citizens should be conceptualized in precisely the opposite manner (e.g.,
Converse and Pierce, 1986; Kinder and Sears, 1985).
Several pieces of evidence supported this critique. I showed that citizens have persistent
views on individual issues that do not correlate strongly with their views on other issues nor
can be predicted well by their scores on a scale. I also showed that support for extreme policies
within policy domains is uncorrelated with state-of-the-art ideological scales often interpreted
as diagnostic of support for extreme policies. I next provided examples of how two widely
accepted findings about representation based on ideological scales may need revisiting. First,
although scholars increasingly accept that American politicians support more extreme policies
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than their reliably moderate constituents would prefer, the policies politicians support appear no
more extreme in general. Moreover, the highly politically active and knowledgeable citizens that
scholars routinely indict for pulling politics to the extremes appear if anything less likely than their
peers to support more extreme policies than legislators. Although they have not been devoted much
attention in this article, measures of respondent’s own ideological self-placement present similar
conceptual issues.19
Ideological scales do have some valid uses, as sometimes scholars are interested in comparing
how likely different collective units in the public are to support liberal policies without regard
to what these policies are. For example, Caughey, Dougal and Schickler (2013) use a
one-dimensional scale to document changes in the public’s propensity to support liberal policies
over the course of the New Deal. Likewise, Gerber et al. (2010) use an ideological scale to examine
whether individuals with different personality profiles are more likely to support liberal policies.20
In these applications, ‘how much likelier is this group of citizens to support a liberal policy than
another group, without regard to which policy?’ is the research question of interest, unlike in
studies of representation.21
This article’s critique be reformulated in the language of multidimensionality, and a critic
adopting this language may note that adding a second or third dimension to ideology models does
not explain much additional variance in Americans’ policy preferences. The lack of predictive
power of an additional dimension is often taken as evidence that one or two dimensions is ‘enough’
(e.g., Jessee, 2009; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013, 2014b). However, merely because adding
one additional dimension does not capture a great deal of the heterogeneity of Americans’ issue
preferences does not mean that additional dimensions do not exist; it merely means that there is
not any one particularly large secondary influence common across all Americans.22 This logic
can be seen by considering a placebo test: a factor analysis of Census-tract-level correlates of
socio-economic status such as race, income, education rates, and marriage rates produce one large
dimension because all these variables correlate moderately; but, this does not mean that race and
marital status are ‘actually the same thing.’ Similarly, there may be hundreds of ‘dimensions’
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to Americans’ policy preferences – some might favor universal healthcare because of a personal
experience with an insurance provider, for example, and others may oppose gay marriage due to
their religious convictions (Tesler, 2014). Simply because there is no single particular factor that
competes in strength with the first dimension does not mean that such factors collectively matter
little and that ‘views on gay marriage’ and ‘views on abortion’ are ‘actually the same thing.’23 As
Figure 3 makes clear, there are many issues on which Americans have persistent views yet that do
not have strong relationships with other policy domains.
Attending to the multidimensionality of citizens’ preferences significantly complicates the task
of studying representation, both empirically and theoretically (e.g., Shepsle and Cox, 2007). But
the consequences of neglecting this inconvenient truth appear far from benign. As Converse
(1964) famously cautioned, “belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or
quantification.” An addendum is perhaps necessary: assume otherwise with peril.
David Broockman <dbroockman@stanford.edu> is Assistant Professor of Political Economy
at Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA, 94305.
Notes
1See also Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004), Hill (2015), and Gilens and Page (2014) in recent literature on
representation and Kinder and Kam (2009) and Tesler (2014) in recent literature on public opinion.
2Some surveys do offer citizens the opportunity to describe their policy views on abstract 7-point scales with
unlabeled points, but, were abstract scales to be employed in this article’s analysis, it would be easier to attribute the
findings to differential item response or non-random measurement error.
3Any such work should be cognizant of some of the drawbacks of this data that ideological scales also share.
For example, by enforcing one-dimensionality within policy domains, this data potentially oversimplifies some
respondents’ views. But ideological scales that describe multiple policy domains do this to a strictly greater extent.
4I replicate this finding in these data; the first factor among the mass public captures about 59% of the variance
while among elites it captures 90%. Factor analysis may exhibit upward bias and be sensitive to the distribution of the
latent factor, so these findings alone are not definitive. Moreover, measurement error may attenuate the mass statistic
considerably. However, Achen (1975) shows that corrections for measurement error do not increase correlations
between policy domains considerably..
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5Indeed, this belief runs so deeply that Jackman and Sniderman (2006) predict (but do not find evidence) that
citizens who think they have issue positions inconsistent with their ideology are not informed enough to know how
they really ‘should’ feel.
6Jackman and Sniderman (2006) evaluates the possibility that citizens would become more ideologically consistent
if they thought through issues more carefully or were exposed to elite rhetoric and finds that they would not.
7The statistical relationship between extremity on the ideological scale and the number of extreme policies
individuals support is negative and nearly significant in the opposite direction (p = 0.09).
8Self-reported ideological extremity also barely predicts extremity on the issue questions. See Figure 7 in the
Supplementary Appendix.
9See also work in a variety of literatures that takes for granted that public opinion is far more extreme than elite
opinion, such as in the literature on immigration (e.g., Morales, Pilet and Ruedin, 2015).
10State legislators were invited to participate by contacting them at their public email addresses. Screener questions
ensured that only legislators themselves were answering the survey.
11The survey was also not intended to query legislators’ personal opinions on the issues at hand but rather their
public positions, the concept at stake in studies of policy representation.
12There are certainly legitimate concerns that can be raised about ideological scales separate from the issues this
article interrogates, but space is limited to elaborate those critiques in detail (see, e.g., Lee, 2009).
13See the Supplementary Appendix for the items used to create the political knowledge scale.
14The self-reported primary voting measure is clearly not ideal, although most existing studies rely on this measure
as well and rarely find different results when subsetting to validated primary voters.
15For a review of early literature on this topic and an early skeptical perspective, see Norrander (1989).
16Empirical studies are remarkably mixed on whether voters prefer ideological moderates (e.g., Adams et al., 2013;
Montagnes and Rogowski, 2012), and when differences between extremists and moderates on valence dimensions are
carefully taken into account, the conclusions of such studies can reverse (e.g., Stone and Simas, 2010).
17As an example of this potential for substantive conclusions to change as a result of this critique, Snyder and
Stro¨mberg (2010) show that legislators whose districts overlap well with newspaper markets tend to be more moderate,
which they interpret as showing that the media helps voters hold legislators accountable to their preferences. If voters
are thought to be uniformly moderate and other political actors uniformly extreme, this interpretation may be relatively
straightforward. However, consider an alternative interpretation of this result: interest groups tend to encourage
ideological moderation, perhaps because it is less likely to lead to changes in the status quo (Baumgartner et al., 2009;
Bonica, 2013); and, when Members of Congress know it is less expensive for interest groups to purchase negative
advertisements against them (because an advertisement in only one newspaper can cover an entire district), they are
more careful not to contravene interest groups’ preferences. This is quite a different view of how media coverage
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affects political accountability. Without the assumption of voter one-dimensionality, which interpretation of Snyder
and Stro¨mberg’s (2010) results is unclear.
18This example illustrates the converse pathology of that shown in Table 2.
19Many citizens have several genuine policy views on both sides of the ideological spectrum, so it is difficult for
their policy views to be accurately described with one location on this spectrum, regardless of whether it is the output of
a scaling procedure or citizens themselves supply it. Those who identify as ‘moderate’ may still be best understood as
‘cross-pressured’ or ‘ideologically mixed,’ rather than as typically supporting moderate policies (Treier and Hillygus,
2009; Zaller, 2004). Consistent with this potential, Figure 7 in the Supplemantary Appendix shows that self-described
moderates are similarly likely to support moderate policies as self-described extremists.
20In the special case when Democratic and Republican candidates for office are at the poles of ideological scales, an
ideological scale might also be useful for summarizing individuals’ policy preferences when estimating the influence
of policy preferences on vote choice (e.g., Jessee, 2009). In this application, ‘on what share of issues does a citizen
agree with the Democratic candidate’ is the quantity we seek to measure, potentially without regard to which issues
these are. However, this interpretation quickly dissipates if there is any differentiation between multiple Democratic
or Republican candidates’ positions on different issues (Hill, 2015).
21Ahler and Broockman (2015) evaluates the possibility that citizens judge representation on the basis of ideological
fit rather than congruence with their positions on individual issues and finds that they do not.
22Some existing literature finds a strong second ‘social issues’ dimension (e.g., Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder,
2006, 2008; Treier and Hillygus, 2009), although this appears to depend upon the data source used. The point this
article makes remains apt regardless of whether one or two dimensions are considered; the argument is that many more
dimensions exist than one or two, even if no one of them is individually large.
23Although this article is agnostic about why the first dimension exists, a simple explanation consistent with the
evidence is that citizens largely arrive at their preferences on distinct issues for idiosyncratic reasons but adopt the
position of their favored political party on some issues (e.g., Glaeser and Ward, 2006).
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Figure 1: Mass Opinion On Individual Issues
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Notes: The policy labeled as a 1 in each question is the most extreme liberal response available, a
3 corresponds to the national Democratic party’s general position, a 5 corresponds to the national
Republican party’s general position, and a 7 is the most extreme conservative response available.
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Figure 2: Strategies for Aggregating Mass Opinion
Distribution of Respondents' Average Responses − Mass Public
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Notes: The histogram in the top panel shows the distribution of respondents’ ‘average responses.’
To compute this figure, I first average each voters’ response across multiple issues and then plot a
histogram of these voter-level response averages, as shown in the top right of Table 3. To calculate
the bottom figure, I followed the aggregation strategy shown at the bottom of Table 3: I first
calculated the marginals on every issue (see next section), and then average the marginals to
describe the ‘typical issue.’
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Figure 3: Test-Retest Polychoric Correlations Within and Across Issues
Notes: Each subgraph depicts responses on a first issue during the first survey wave on the x-axis
and responses on a second test a month later on the y-axis. Raw data is plotted with jitter given
the categorical nature of the variables. Red lines depict the loess smoothed relationship between
the responses. Polychoric correlations are shown above each graph. Issue names for the x- and
y-axes of each graph are shown, respectively, along the top and left of the figure.
Figure 4: Extremity On Ideological Scales Does Not Predict Support For Actual Extreme Policies
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Figure 5: Strategies for Aggregating Elite Opinion
Distribution of Respondents' Average Responses − Legislators
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Notes: The panels were computed identically to Figure 2, but with the elite sample.
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Figure 6: Relationships Between Political Knowledge, Ideology Scale, and Support for Extreme
Policies
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Table 1: Example: Studying Extremism with Ideological Scales
Voter Legislator
Ideal Gay Rights
Policy
Do not allow gays to
teach in public
schools (Extremely
conservative)
Civil unions only, no
same-sex marriage
(Moderately
conservative)
Answer to survey
question / Roll call
vote: “Should gay
marriage be
illegal?”
Yes Yes
Ideal Immigration
Policy
Open borders;
unlimited
immigration
(Extremely liberal)
Limit low-skilled
immigration with
border protections
(Moderately
conservative)
Answer to survey
question / Roll call
vote: “Should
immigration be
restricted?”
No Yes
One-Dimensional
Ideology Estimated
From Survey
Responses / Votes
Moderate Extreme
Conservative
Table 2: Example: Studying Congruence with Ideological Scales
Liberal Survey Response? Liberal Vote?
Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5 Legislator
Issue 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
Issue 2 0 1 1 0 1 1
Issue 3 1 1 1 0 0 1
Issue 4 0 1 0 1 1 1
Issue 5 1 0 0 1 1 1
Estimated One- 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 1
Dimensional Ideology
Notes: The majority of voters favor the liberal policy on each issue, as does the legislator. Despite
voting congruently with majority opinion on every issue, the legislator appears ‘more extreme’ on
one dimension.
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Table 3: Strategies for Aggregating Mass Opinion, Example Data
Issue 1 Issue 2 Mean Aggregation Strategy
Voter 1’s Responses 1 7 4
Voters’ ‘Average Responses’Voter 2’s Responses 6 1 3.5
% At 1 50% 50% 50%
Pattern on ‘Typical Issue’% At 6 50% 0% 25%
% At 7 0% 50% 25%
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